Purpose: Since the literature on the effect of the unemployment rate as reflection of economic fluctuations on crime shows an empirically ambiguous effect, this study argues that a new way of modelling the dynamics of unemployment and crime by focusing on the transitory and persistent effect of unemployment on crime helps resolve this ambiguity. Originality: The paper is the first to examine the dynamics of the interaction of crime and economic fluctuations using the temporary and persistent effects framework of Mundlak (1978) . In one set of estimates, one can evaluation both the short-and long-run effects of changes of unemployment on crime.
I. Introduction
On an intuitive level, one should expect a strong relationship between crime and economic fluctuation socio-economic status. During a downturn, income decreases and poverty and unemployment rises leading to social exclusion and deprivation which induces stress and frustration. These make for a frayed social fabric that causes crime to increase. In addition, a sharp change in income and wealth may provide an increasing motivation and growing set of opportunities criminal behavior.
The above conjectures have provoked a substantial body of research starting early in the twentieth century (Bonger, 1916) . Thomas (1927) provides evidence of a strong negative correlation between various types of crime rates and the business cycle, and her results were confirmed by Henry and Short (1954) . Since then there has been a very large literature on the crime-business cycle relationship, although much of the investigations within the discipline of economics into the relationship have often found that the positive link between unemployment and crime is weak at best and often there are results showing no effect of unemployment rates on crime.
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The standard theoretical framework underpinning the crime -unemployment relationship in economics is founded on the work of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973 Ehrlich ( , 1975 . In general, these approaches model the supply of criminal offences which is determined on two key factors. The first involves the probability of getting caught and the severity of punishments if convicted of a crime. If these increase, one would expect that individuals will be less likely to try to commit a crime. The second issue is the person's preferences toward criminal activity. While difficult to measure directly, an important aspect of this factor is the alternative to crime -namely, labor market participation. If employment and wages are generally high, the opportunity cost of participating in criminal activity is high. Conversely, if there is substantial unemployment, the opportunity cost of spending time in criminal activity is low and should lead to higher crime rates.0 F 1 Using this theory as base, a number of economists have attempted to determine empirically the relationship between crime and unemployment. Early comprehensive literature reviews by Tarling (1982) , Chiricos (1987) , Freeman (1983) and Box (1987) highlight the conclusion that there appears to be only a moderate positive causal link between unemployment and crime. This conclusion is further confirmed in later work by Freeman (1992 Freeman ( , 1995 Freeman ( , and 1999 who finds that the link between crime and unemployment is fragile at best. In more recent work, Choe (2008) , in investigating the effects of inequality on crime, generally finds no statistically significant effect of unemployment on crime rates using a US state-level dataset from 1995-2004 while the positive relationship between unemployment and crime is confirmed by Lin (2008) . Gould et al. (2002) also report that both wages and unemployment are related to crime, but that wages play a larger role in the crime trends over the last few decades.
Although the above review focuses on the research in the economic discipline of the link between crime and unemployment, discourse in criminology and other social sciences shows other pathways though which unemployment can affect crime. Candor and Land (1985) develop a theoretical model to propose that the aggregate unemployment rate may affect criminal activity by increasing levels of criminal motivation and by influencing the availability and vulnerability of criminal targets and, thus, the number of criminal opportunities.1 F 2 Furthermore, other criminologists focus on the psychological effects of social exclusion on forming individuals' behaviors. Thus, Sampson and Laub (1993) , Lemert (1967) and Farrington (1977) suggest that the strength of social bonds can explain participation in criminal activities and that people may become locked into a cycle of offending since if they are caught and punished are deliberately stigmatized by the criminal justice system. Bourguignon (1998) shows that crime rates are positively correlated with income inequality and relative poverty.2 F 3 Furthermore, Rosenfeld and Fornango (2007) propose that consumer sentiment has significant effects on robbery and property crime rates and they find that it significantly affects the crime decline during the 1990s.
In other research, criminality has been found by Sampson and Laub (1993) to be dependent upon social structure and social networks while Warr (2002) finds that influence of peers is also important. Thus, the individual's position in the structure of society influences his or her criminal behavior. However, all of these factors are influenced by unemployment since the strength of social bonds, the level of participation in society and positive self-image and social behavior of peers are determined, at least in part, by the level of deprivation, unemployment and social exclusion which are functions of both the duration and the severity of the economic downturns.
Furthermore, the 2001 special issue of the Journal of Quantitative Criminology provides numerous important insights for the theoretical and empirical investigation of crimeunemployment relationship, offering multiple explanations of the fragility of the crime unemployment relationship primarily by drawing attention to the statistical approaches which are used in the literature. For example, Greenberg (2001) uses a cointegration approach to identify the long term relationship between crime and unemployment as reflected in the prevailing lag structure. In contrast, Britt (2001) questions the overall suitability of this particular methodology used by Greenberg (2001) .
Later in the same issue of the journal, Levitt (2001) advocates using natural experiments and disaggregated panel estimation which highlights a common theme in the literature by using panel datasets to estimate the unemployment-crime relationship. Doyle et al. (1999) , Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) , Levitt (2004) and Mocan and Bali (2010) use state-level data to find unemployment effects on property crime rates (with moderate or no effects on other crime rates in the cases where they examine other types of crimes). In similar line, Arvanities and DeFina (2006) find that economic downturns affect property crimes and robbery, and Phillips and Land (2012) find a strong and consistent pattern of unemployment on burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft crime via both opportunity and motivation effects . Interestingly, Andresen (2012) finds that motivation matters in the long run whereas opportunity (guardianship) matters in the short run.
Using a quasi -experimental analysis, Bushway, Cook and Phillips (2012) using data over 13 business cycles, investigate the effects of short term fluctuations of unemployment on crime establishing that an economic contraction causes an increase in burglary and robbery rates.
Thus, this brief review of the literature suggests several key points. The papers suggest that improving the wider socioeconomic context in which individuals live can reduce crime and decrease crime participation. Hence, it is not only that the poverty or deprivation of individual families leads to crime but it is also the wider context of social stress and disorder caused by unemployment that dissolves the social fabric during the downturns which causes the increase in criminality. In this sense, economic prosperity 'is the best police for preventing crimes' (Smith, 1793) .
Furthermore, the literature also suggests a careful econometric modelling of the relationship between crime and unemployment. While much of the economics literature examines a contemporaneous relationship between crime and unemployment, criminology and other social sciences literatures suggest that other factors are important. In particular, factors such as social exclusion and prolonged deprivation suggest that there may be long run effects that need to be investigated. Even when time is recognized to be a factor (e.g. as in Andresen, 2012) , it is useful for policy reasons to distinguish and model simultaneously both the transitory and persistent effects of unemployment on crime. Thus, this paper proposes an econometric methodology that decomposes the unemployment effect on crime into a transitory and persistent effect highlighting the dynamic nature of this relationship for different types of crime namely violent crime, property, murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny theft and vehicle theft. It shows that the standard way of investigating the relationship of using a fixed effects methodology to link crime rates and unemployment rates can be modified to generate the intuitive and theoretical effects between crime and the health of the economy.
Using crime data for US states over a 40 year period, it is found that there is a strong positive relationship between unemployment and a wide range of different crimes. In particular it is also shown that the persistent effect of unemployment rates has a particularly large impact on crime rates, highlighting that the factors that relate to long term unemployment are key policy issues to examine when looking to mitigate crime rates.
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics
In order to examine the issues discussed above, data on crime rates, unemployment rates, and other covariates are collected at the US state level from 1965 to 2006. Several different categories of crime rates per 100,000 people from the Unified Crime Reports are used:3 F 4 violent crime, property crime, murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny theft, and vehicle theft. Unemployment rates, the proportion of a state's population that are in various age ranges, the proportions which are white, African-American, or Hispanic, the proportions with no high school, high school, or college degrees, the proportion of adults who are divorced and the proportion of single female headed households with minors are obtained from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics website (www.bls.gov) or from Flood et al. (2015) . A quadratic specification of time trends is also used in the regressions. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on crime rates. The first column reports the average crime rates across all states and years. The highest crime rates are property crime and larceny theft, and the lowest are rape and murder. To see if there are differences by unemployment rates, the sample is disaggregated in two ways. First, the sample is split by whether the unemployment rate of the specific year is below or above of the overall (unweighted) median unemployment rate for all states and years. For each crime-rate type, the rate is higher when the unemployment rate is above the median, particularly for violent crime, murder, and robbery.
Of course, states vary in their levels of unemployment through time in systematic ways.
An alternative comparison is to examine whether there are differences in crime rates if a state's unemployment rate is below or above the state's average unemployment rate over the period . Using this comparison, the average crime rates are reported in the final two columns of Table 1 . The differences in crime rates between high and low unemployment rates time periods 7 are much smaller compared to the former comparison but generally confirm the previously described pattern. When actual unemployment is above the average state unemployment rate, the crime rate is higher compared to the case where actual unemployment is below the average state unemployment rate for violent crime, murder, robbery, aggravated assault, and vehicle theft. For the other crime-rate types, crime is (generally slightly) higher during low unemployment times.
III. Methodology and Regression Results
The above evidence relies on averages and ignores the effect of possible confounding factors, such as demographic makeup of the state and measures of the 'social fabric' of the state.
In order to control such confounding factors a more rigorous analysis is required. This section describes several different empirical methodologies to investigate whether unemployment is correlated with higher or lower crime rates, ceteris paribus. Since this paper utilizes panel data, the estimating equation has the form:
where for state j and year t, C is (the log of) a crime-rate type, X is a vector of demographic controls for the age, race, educational characteristics of each state and a time trend, U is the unemployment rate approximating the fluctuation of economic fortunes, and I is per capita income in each state.
The last two terms, s and ε, are unobserved components of the error term, although the former is specific to a state.
A. Basic Specification
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The standard empirical specification with panel data is to assume that the unobserved statespecific component of the error term has a fixed-effect relationship with the dependent variable.
Thus, the estimation of equation (1) would imply estimating a set of state-level fixed effects.
The coefficient on the unemployment rate and per capita income (divided by 1000) for each crime type are reported in columns (1) and (2) 
B. Transitory and Persistent Effects of Unemployment on Crime Rates
While the fixed-effects methodology is a standard approach, it exhibits some important and well-known shortcomings. First, it assumes that the state effect is fixed over time, possibly a strong assumption if there had been changes in crime policy at the state level over the time period.
Second, any time invariant effect is subsumed into the fixed effect, making the fixed effect 9 economically uninterpretable as it is just the sum of any and all the state specific fixed effects.
Although an alternative specification that addresses the shortcomings of the fixed effects estimator would be to model sj as a random effect, it has problems of its own, namely that it assumes that E(sj|Xj, Uj, Ij)=0,
which is unlikely to be the case. Mundlak (1978) , however, offers a compromise between the two assumptions (also echoed by Greene, 2008, pp. 209-10) by specifying equation (2) as follows:
where the bar over the variable vector indicates the mean value of the variable for the state. If one substitutes equation (3) into a random effects form of equation (1), the specification of equation
(1) becomes:
As Greene (2008) states, this retains the random effects specification but should also appropriately deal with the problem of any correlation between the unobserved effects (particularly sj) and the
The specification of equation (4) What is the economic intuition of this decomposition? Holding per capita income constant, one might expect that the impact of a downturn approximated by an increase in the unemployment rate might be cumulative and the effects of a change in the economic fortunes on crime rates might be felt for many years after the event of the rise of the unemployment rate. This could be the case regardless of the pathway that unemployment impacts crime. For example, because unemployment insurance mitigates the drop in income for at least 26 weeks, long duration unemployment would exhaust these benefits, making the need for income greater. Likewise, it may take time for the social fabric to fray, so temporary changes in unemployment may not have as much of an effect as a more persistent change in the unemployment rate. The effect of an economic downturn on crime may take a long time to manifest itself, and, thus, one should not expect the only effect of unemployment on crime to be of the contemporaneous nature modeled 11 above. It is important to note that this is also consistent with the criminology literature reviewed earlier which stresses the persistent deprivation and inequality effects on crime. These should not be expected to be contemporaneous, but that they play out their impact on crime rates over the long term. To establish the exogeneity of the instruments used in the HT method, an overidentification test using a Sargan-Hansen statistic is implemented (Schaffer and Stillman, 2010) . The results of this test are given in column (4) of Table 4 . In every case, the test statistic is small enough where the exogeneity of the instruments is not rejected at the conventional five percent level. Thus, the HT method is appropriately correcting for endogeneity.
The first three columns of Table 4 contain the results from the HT procedure that assumes that the transitory and persistent effects of unemployment and income are endogenous.9 F 10 In general, the effect is the slight increase of the statistical significance of the transitory effect of unemployment in reducing some crime rates so that these results look similar to the results from the fixed-effects regression reported in Table 2 . From Table 3 , the transitory unemployment variable is significant only for property , robbery and burglary crimes,. However, when the persistent effects of unemployment on crime corrected for endogeneity, the coefficients are significant and positive for all types of crime except for violent crime and vehicle theft. The important change is the increase in the size of the coefficient -making an already high marginal effect even more pronounced.1 0 F 11 As before, income is still generally negatively correlated with crime, with highly statistically significant coefficients -violent crime, property crime, rape, robbery, burglary and vehicle theft.
C. Robustness Check 1: Controlling for Cross-panel Correlations
One key assumption of fixed-and random-effects estimation procedures is that there should be no cross-sectional correlations in the data. That is, in terms of equation (1), to obtain efficient estimates, cov(εjt,εis)=0 for j≠i and t≠s. If this condition is violated then, while the estimated coefficients will be unbiased the standard errors would not be correct.
To examine this issue, two tests are conducted. First, correlations in the errors (cov(εjt,εis)) across the 50 states and Washington, DC are estimated. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 In each case as shown in column (3), for all crime regressions, the z-statistic from the test has a p-value is less than 0.0001. Given these statistics, it is likely that cross panel correlations need to be taken into account in the estimation procedure.
The most direct way of correcting for the cross panel correlation is to use the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) approach, which can be specified to control for cross-panel correlations. Unfortunately, the use of this procedure is not without its problems. On the one hand, Wooldridge (2002, p. 162) indicates that if there is cross-panel correlation, FGLS is more efficient than any other estimator that assumes no correlation (also echoed in Greene, 2000, p. 470ff). On the other hand, coefficient estimates from FGLS may not be the same as those obtained from OLS or fixed effects estimations because the calculation of the coefficients is weighted by 14 an estimated variance-covariance matrix.1 2F 13 Thus correcting for the cross panel correlation can lead to better standard errors, but can generate differences in the coefficient estimates.1 3F 14 Table 6 contains the results from the estimated coefficients from this estimation.
Interestingly controlling for these correlations explicitly suggests that not only are most of the persistent effects of unemployment positive on crime (except for property crime and larceny theft), but so are the transitory effects. The effects of income are somewhat more mixed, as some correlations are positive (violent crime, murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault and vehicle theft) while others are negative (e.g. property crime, burglary and larceny theft).
D. Robustness Check 2: Controlling for Imprisonment Effects
The economics literature reviewed earlier suggests that crime rates are partially determined by the severity of punishment. Although punishment may have an independent effect on crime rates, an issue of importance for this study is to examine whether punishment diminishes the effects of unemployment rate on crime. Hence, it is useful to see if the results above are robust to including a measure of punishment. Data on imprisonment rates by state and year from 1965 to 2006 are utilized. These rates are included in the regressions to attempt to control for these effects.1 4F 15 show few statistically significant effects of unemployment on a variety of crime rates, and when the relationship is statistically significant, it is negative -implying that increases in unemployment rates decrease crime.
However, it is shown that this standard specification is not the correct one. Indeed, respecifying the empirical relationship does find a positive relationship between crime rates and unemployment. By decomposing the unemployment effect on crime into a transitory and 16 persistent effect this study shows that, in particular, the persistent effect of an increase in unemployment is to increase all types of crime rates in contrast with previous studies which highlighted effects on some of the types of crime. This finding is robust to a number of specifications -including controlling for endogeneity, cross-panel correlations, and crime deterrence. Thus, it appears that, as Adam Smith put it, economic prosperity 'is the best police for preventing crimes'. Table 2 . Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics based on standard errors clustered by state. *, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical significance, respectively. Table 2 as well as state mean values for the other independent variables as instruments. The endogenous variables in the equation are transitory and persistent unemployment, income, state divorce rate and state single female headed household rate. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics based on standard errors clustered by state. *, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical significance, respectively. 0.054*** (39.92) Notes: Coefficients and standard errors (used to calculate the t-statistics which are in parentheses) are averaged across 500 randomized FGLS regressions where there are no more than 41 states in the regression. All FGLS regressions are estimated controlling for cross-panel correlation and heteroscedasticity. Also controlled for, but not reported, are the list of regressors given in Table 3 . *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
